THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, appointed by the late Congress, and which by a resolution of one or both Houses was permitted to continue its sittings after the expiration of the official term of that Congress, concluded on Friday last one branch of its labors by the ad prion of a Report devoted chirfly to the Operations of the Army of the Potomac.

This Report, as we learn from its pages, is to be fol lowed by others relating to the first battle at Bull Run-the troops there engaged having been the nucleus of the Army of the Potomac-and to the disastrous conflict at Ball's Buff, in which portions of the troops of the same army were engaged. A Report is also promised on the Western D par'm ut. The battle at Fredericksburg is noticed only in part. No mention is made of the operations in the She naudeah and Mountain Departments. As regards the cam; a gu of the Aru y of Vuginia, under Gen. Pope, the committee says that the circumst-nees connected with it " have been so ful y investigated by the military c urts in the cases of Grn. McDowell and Gen. Porter" that be committee "deemed it unnecessary to make so there ugh an investigation of that campaign as they would otherwise have done." It therefore confines itself to a recital of the orders and correspondence in relation to the delays in the forwarding of Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Frank in's corps from Alexandria to the assistance of Gen. Pope." For the same reason—that the subject has been investi gated by a military commission—the committee has not decimed it necessary to take much testimony in relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and does not p. opose, as we inter, to make any report in regard to that affair.

The Report before us would, if meerted at large, occupy near'y four pages of our paper. Three-fourths of it is occupied with the military services of Gen. McClellan commencing with his appointment as the successor of Gen. Scott, and coming down to November last, when he was re-leved of the command of the Army of the Potomac. His forces, his movements, his delays, his repeated calls for reinforcements, his differences with the President and General-in-Chief, his alleged failure to provide proper protection for the national capital, &c., with much of which our readers are already fam liar, are adverted to, more or less at large, and interspersed with unfavorable views of his operations in the field, based upon the opinious of other officers who were called before the committee. The testimony is not yet printed, and of course does not accompany the report, to which we shall have occasion to recur hereafter.

We place before our readers in the following columns the remaining branches of the Report.

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

In December, 1861, a Joint Committee of the two Houses of Congress, consisting of three members of the Sceate and four members of the House of Representatives, was appointed, with instructions to inquire into the con-duct of the present war.

Your committee proceeded to the discharge of the duty

Your committee proceeded to the discharge of the duty devolved upon them, and have labored zealously, and they tru-t faithfully, for that purpose. As evidence of that, they would refer to the large mass of testimony taken by

them upon many subjects, and herewith reported.

The subject of inquiry referred to them was one of the utmost importance and magnitude. Upon "the conduct of the present war" depended the issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after so much expenditure o blo d and treasure—the e-table-bment of a nation founded upon the capacity of man for self-g verom-n'. The nation was engaged in a contest for its v ry existence; a rebellion, unparallel d in history, threatened the overthrow of our free institutions, and the most prompt and vigorous measures were demanded by every cons deration of honor, patriotism, and a due regard for the prosperity and hap-Your committee could perceive no necessity for recom-

mending any pa ticular legislation to Congress. Its pre vious course showed that no such recomm-ndation was required. When Congress met the preceding July, fresh from the people—called upon to provide for the safety of the Government and the maintenance of the national honor and existence—the Representatives of the People gave full evid-nee that they comprehended the duty devolved upon them, and had the courage and will to fully duscharge it. The Administration called by the people to the head of the Government, in this the most critical period of the nation's history, was more promptly and tully supported than that of any other Governm which history has preserved any record. The call of the President for money and men had been more than com plied with; no legislation which he had deemed necessary had been denied by Congress; and the people had most nobly and generous y supported and sustained what their representatives had promised in their name. The same representatives had promised in their name. The same Congress, fresh from their constituents, had again met, and there could be no doubt that as they had before acted so would they continue to act. It needs but to refer to the history of the Congress just closed, its prompt and thorough act on, clothing the Executive with the fullest power, placing at his disposal all the resources of men and committee judged rightly that Congress needed no

committee jurged rightly that Congress needed no prempting from them to do its entire duty.

Not upon those whose duty it was to provide the mean necessary to put down the rebellion, but upon those whose duty it was to rightfully apply those means, and the agents

they emply yed for that purpo e, rested the bame, f any, that the hopes of the nation have not be in realized, and its expectations have been so long disappointed.

Your o multice therefore concluded that they would best perform their duty by endeavoring to obtain such informs ion in respect to the conduct of the war as would best enable them to advise what mistakes had been made in the past and the proper course to be pursued in the fu-ture; to obtain such information as the many and laboriou duties of the President and his Cabinet prevented them from acquiring, and to lay it before them with such recom-me dations and suggestions as seemed to be most imperatively demanded; and the journal of the proceedings of your committee show that for a long time they were in constant communication with the President and his Cabi net, and neglected no opportunity of at once laying befor them the in ormation acquired by them in the course o

their investigations.

Many specific subjects of investigation presented them selves for the consideration of your committee, any one of which might well require the action of a committee for the attention of all the Representatives in Congress. I was apparent from the first that your comm tee would b ed to confine their attention to a few of the more prominent subjects of inquiry—to those the investigation of which would best enable them to comprehend the causes and precessity, if any, for the delay and inaction characterizing the opera ione of our armies in the field.

And whi e each of those subjects has received from then the attention which its importance merited, so far as they were able to give it, the attention of your committee has been turned more particularly to the history of the Army of the Potomae. In the history of that a my is to be fou all that is necessary to coable your committee to report upon "the conduct of the war." Had that army fulfilled all that a generous and coufiding people were justified in expecting from it, this rebellion had long since been crushexpecting from it, this rebellion had long since been crushed, and the blessings of peace restored to this nation. The failure of that army to fulfit those expectations has prolonged this contest to the present time, with all its expenditure of life and treasure, for it has to a great extent neutralized, if not entirely destroyed, the legitimate fruits which would otherwise have been reaped from our glorious

victories in the West.

Therefore, while your committee have not failed to tak the testimony of witnesses in relation to military opera-tions in other parts of the country, and also upon various subjects to which their attention has been specially directed by Congress and the War Department since the com mit ee was first appointed, the principal part of the testi-mony taken by them relates to the Army of the Potomac and those subjects more immediately connected with its operations. They have taken the testimony of nearly two bundred witnesses, simost entirely men in the military ser-vice of the Government, including about one hundred Gen-

The disaster at Bull Run in July, 1861, was fully invest tigated by your committee, as being the first conflict of the national troops with armed treason upon the field of battle; and also because the troops there engaged formed the nucleus around which has since been collected the vast and magnificent army of the Potomic. The result of their investigation your committee submit in a separa e report. Your committee have also investigated the disaster at Ball's Bluff, that battle being the first conflict of any extent in which any of the troops of the Army of the Poro-mac were engaged after its re-organization. A separate report of that disaster is also submitted.

Immediately after the organization of your committee, and before proceeding to the taking of any testimony, they addressed to Gen. McClilian, who, by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become General-in-Chief of the Army, the following communication:

WASHINGTON DECEMBER 21, 1861. "Sig: You are aware that a Joint Committee has been appointed by the Schate and House of Representatives to inquire into 'the conduct of the war.' Our committee, at a quire into 'the conduct of the war.' Our committee, at a meeting held this morning, unanimously expressed a desire, before proceeding in their official duties, to have an inter-

wiew with you at our room at the Capitol, at such time as may suit your convenience, in view of your pressing engagements. Our place of meeting is the room of the Committee n Territorias o the Senate.

"I remain, very respectfully, yours,
"B. F. Wade, Chairman,
"Major General Gro. B. McClellan,
"General Commanding Army United States."

While fully appreciating the dignity and power with which they were clothed by the concurrent action of both Houses of Congress, they deemed it but just to award to his position the consideration of asking him to confer with them in relation to the best method of fulfilling those expectations which the prople had a right to hope for from an Administration which they had, through their Representatives, conferred such plenary powers. A reference to the journal of y ur committee will show that ill bealth prevented Gen McClellan from immediately complying with this invitation. The necessities of the case, however, were so pressing and urgent that your committee con uded to proceed at once to the taking of testimony.

[ Here follows the committee's view of the operations of he Army of the Potomac and of Grn. McClellan's campaigns, to which we have before alluded.]

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

On the 16th of November Gen. Bu uside started the co units of his a m fr in Warrenton to Fredericksburg, not having heard any thing of the delay of the pontions do not re ch G n. Barn id until the 19 n of November. The corps of Gen Sum or was in the a v nee, and it w s the i ten ion that he should cross over to F eduick burg and t ke prosession of the place. But the con-arrival the pen cons to time prevented the movement which rad een contemplated, and necess ated the adoption of other

Ges. Burnside then began to make preparations for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as rapidly as

possible, to enable his forces to cross the river.

The plan determined upon was to cross the river at two points; the right wing to cross opposite Frederick-burg, and the left wing to cross from three to four miles below the city. The left wing was composed of the left grand division, with a corps from the c-nire grand division, making a force of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole ring under commard of M jer Gen. Franklin. The crossg was made successfully at both points, but with much opposition from sharpshooters on the right.

G. n. Burnside states the following in regard to his plan

"The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of line of hei, hts where we made our attack, by means o which they connected the two wings of their arry, and evoided a long detour around through a bad country, obtained from a colored man, from the others de of the town, information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I suppose would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; an ten I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and n out of their works."

The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who com nanded the left :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC "Headquarters army of the Potomac.

"December 13, 5.55 A. M.

"General Hardie will arry this despatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapit movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well upon tred and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Summer's column of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Summer's command up the plank road to its intersection of the te'egraph road, where t ey will divice, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those road. Holdi'g these heights, with the heights near C ptain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole sidge between these points. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with a tiew of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement ouring the fog. Two of General Hockers divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Co less of instructions to General's Summer and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an ord-rly very soon. Ye will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fights. The watchword which, it possible, should be given to every

omp say, will be 'Scott.'
"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, you JOHN G PARKE, "Chief of Staff. bedient servant,

"Major General Franklin, "Commanding Department, Grand Division Army

General Franklin s ates, when lest examined, that he re seived the above order at about 7 30 A M., and that he at once took measures to carry out what he considered to be the measing of the order, that is, "an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was." In his testimony, given then vour committee were at Falmouth, he says: in all the troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command, as ar as I could, and at the same time keep my connection

with the river open." From the testimony it would appear that the attack we in reality made by one of the smallest divisions to Gen Frankin's command—the division of Gen. Meade, num bering about 4,500 men. This division was supported or its right by Gen Gibbon's division of about 5,000 men x reme left of our line, nearly at right angles with Gen. deade's division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen Meade's division advanced to the attack, Gen. Birney's division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, numbering ab ut 7.000, came up and took position immediately in rear of

Gen. Mende. The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing the first line of the enemy, and gaining the creat of the Gen. Gibbon, seeing Grn. Meade advancing to the attack, ordered his division forward. After his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy with the bayonet, and be was preparing his batteries to open upon a rebel regument that made their appearance on his left, Gen Gibbon wamade their appearance on his left, Gen Gibbon was woulded and taken from the fild Gen. Meade's division having reached the creat of the hill, formed themselves in he presence of the reserves of the enemy, who opened fire upon bem in front, and they also received a fire upon h or flank. The super ority of the enemy was so over-waslining that Meane's division was forced back, as was a so Gibbon's div soon. The enemy pursued un il crecked by Brney's division. Our firces con inned to hold their position, without renewing the strack, un if they were ordered to withdraw acres the river.

The loss sustand in the attack, in killed, wounded, and missing, were as follows: Mende's division, 1,760; Gib-

bon's division, 1,249 ; Buney's division, 961 Gen Burnelle, upon hearing of the small force ordered to attack the enemy sent an order to Gen. Franklin to make a vigorous a tack with his whole force. Several of

the witnesses testily that had the attack been renewed with all the available force under Gen. Franklin's com mand it would have been succ-asful. Gen. Franklin testi fies that it was not an order, but a request, and that when he received it it was too late to renew the attack, and herefore be did not do it. Gen. Franklin test fies es follows:

The order under which I was acting directed that the line of retreat should be kept open. It also directed that I should hold my troops in position for a rap d march down the Richmond road. I never dresured that this was considered as a strong attack at a l, until since the buttle tool place At that time I had no idea that it was the main at tack, but supposed it was an armed observation to a certack, but supposed it was an armed observation to a certain where the enemy was. . . . I was strong hened in this opinion by the staff officer who brought it (the order)

"Question. Did you not understand, from this order. that you were to use all the troops necessary to seize and hold the beights near Cap ain Hamilton's, and that the General commanding considered that that was necessary

to be done in order to secure success?

"Answer. No: I did not I should suppose that the order would not have limited me to 'at least a division,' as the wording of it shows, had such been his intention; and besides, he directs me to keep my whole command in posi tion to more along the old Richmond road. If he had in-tended me to use my whole force, if necessary, to hold that hill, he hardly would have coupled it with the condition to keep my command in readiness for this other movement. "Question. Was the other movement feasible until after the possession of those heights by our troops?

Answer. I think that the other movement, if it had been ordered with my whole force, would have necessarily avolved the possession of those heights. Had I been or dered to move my whole force along the Richmond road, I should have been compelled to take all that would be found in the road, and there neights would have been in the road.

Question. As it was indispensable that we should have possession of those heights in order to move down the old R chmond road, and as you were ordered to send out at least one division to pass below Smithfi-li and seige, if possible, those heigh a, d d you not deem that that order re quired of you that you should, when repulsed in the first at empt, ren w the attack ?

Answer. I think it did; but by the time the rebel were driven back i to the woods, by Bi ney's division and S ckels's division, it was past three o'clock. It was dark, at that time, by five o'clock, and it was too late then to make such an attempt with the slightest hope of success.

The testimony of all the witnesses before your commit too proves most conclusively that, had the attack been made upon the left with all the force which Gen. Franklin could have used for that purpose, the plan of Gen. Burnside would have been completely successful, and our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory

After the attack on Saturday our army remained in po

until Mouday night, when it was withdrawn across the river without loss. Your committee have not considered it essential to

post up a the operations of the right wing of our srmy in battle, for the reason that the success of the movement evidently depended to a very great extent upon the successful operation of the left. Although our troops on the right fought most gallantly, making repeated attacks,

INTERFERENCE WITH GEN. BURNSIDE'S PLANS. On the 26th day of January, 1863, the following resolu-tion was adopted by the Sonate, and referred to your

" Resolved That the Committee on the Conduct of the Resolved That the Committee on the Conductor the was be instructed to i quire whether Maj. Gen A K. Barnside has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for the m vement of the Army of the rotomac, or any portion of the same; and if so, whether any sub-idinate general of said army have written to or vis ted Washington to 'ppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with, and if a , by what authority."

Under that resolution, your committee proceeded to take the testimony of Major Generals A. E. Burnside and John G. Parke, and Begadier Generals John Newton, John Cochrane, and William W. Averill. That testimony brings

to light the following facts: Shortly af er the bat le of Fred-rick-burg, Gen. Burn-The main army was to cross at a place some ax or even miles below F. ed-ricksburg. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossing were all selected; the roads were all surveyed, and the cordu oy was cut for preparing the roads. At the same time a feint of crossing was to be made some dis ance above. Fa mouth, which feint could be turned into a positive attick should the on my di cover the movement below; otherwise the main attack was to be made below.

In connex on with this movement of the main army.

cavalry expedit on was organized, consisting f twenty-five hundred of the best cavalry in the A my of the Potomic, one thousand of whom were picked men. The plante that expedition was as follows: Accompanied by a bright of nfantry detail d to prote the cossing of the Ra public ock, it was to proceed up to Kelly's Ford; there the thou-and picked men were to cross, and to proceed to the Ripidan and cross that river at Raccoon Ford; then to go neward and er es the Virginia Central rai road at Louisa Court-house; the James river at Gooch and or Carter's, blowing up the locks of the James rive canal at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at a point south of there, blowing up the iron bridge at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond. Petersburg, and Weldon railroad where it eressed the Nottoway river, de-Gen. Pryor's command, and effect a junction with General Peck at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in waiting to t ke them to Aquis creek. To distract the attention of the enemy, and deceive them in regard to which body of cavalry was the attacking column, at the time the thou-and picked men crossed the Rappahannock a portion of the remaining fifteen hundred was to proceed towards Warrenton; another portion towards Culpeper Court house; and the remainder were to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and then return. While this country expedition was in progress the general movement was to be made across the river.

On the 26th of December an order was issued for the entire command to prepare three d.y.' co. ked rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' small rations, if possible: to have from ten to twelve days' supply of bre cattle with them: to take forage for their te-m- a d the ir artillery and cavalry horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition—in fact, to be in a condition to move at

Shor ly after that order was usued Gen John Newton and Gen. John Cochrans—the one commanding a division and the other a brigade in the left grand division, under Gen. William B. Franklin—came up to Washington on leave of absence. Previous to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. Franklin, they informed him and Gen. William F. Smith that when they came to Washington they should take the opportunity to represent to some one in authority here the dispirited condition of the army, and the danger there was in attempting any movement rgainst the enemy a

When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane, as he states, endeavored to find certain members of Congress to whom to make the desired communication. Failing to find them, he determined to seek an interview with the President for the purpose of making the communication directly to him. On proceeding to the President's House, he there met Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object of his being there and the general purport of his proposed communication to the President, and requested him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. Seward promised to do, and which he did do.

That day the interview took place, and General Newton opened the subject to the President, as Gen, Newton expresses it, "very na urally conceived that they had come there for the purpose of injuries." ing Geo. Burnside, and suggesting some other person to fill his place." Geo. Newton states that, while he firmly beheved that the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the army was the want of confidence in the military caoac ty of Gen. Bureside, he deem di improper to say s to the Pres dent "right quare out," and therefore ender cored to convey the same idea indirectly. When asked if he considered it any les improper to do such a thing indi-rectly than it was to do it directly, he qualified his prerious assert on by saying that his object was to inform the President of what he considered to be the could into f the army, in the hope that the President would make inquiry and learn the true cause for himself. Upon proceiving the impression upon the mind of the President, Generals Newou and Cochrane state that they hastened to assure the President that he was en irely mistaken, and so for suc reeded that at the close of the interview the President said them he was glad they had called upon him, and that he would result from the interview

To return to Gen. Burnside. The cavilry expedition had started; the brigade of infantry detailed to accompan it had crossed the Rappshannock at Richard's Ford, and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at Kelly's Ford. The day th y had arranged to make the crossing Gen. Burnside received from the President the following telegram: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general mov nent without let ing me know of it."

Gen. Burn ide states ht he could not imagine, at the time, what reason the President could have for sending him such a telegram. None of the officers of his command, except one or two of he staff who had remained in camp. had been told any thing of his plan beyond the simple fact that a movement was to be made. He could only suppose that the despatch related in some way to important in litary movements in other parts of the country, in which it

Was necessary to have co-operation.

Upon the receipt of that telegram steps were imm diately taken to han the cava ry . xpedition wh re it then was (a Kelly's Ford) u til further orders. A portion of it was shortly alterward - sent off to intercept Stuart, who and just made a said to Dumfries and the neighborhood o

Farfax Court house, which it failed to do.
Gen Burneide come to Washington to a certain from th President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that some General officers from the army of He was informed by the Potomac, whose names he declared to give, had called upon him and represented that Gen Burnside contemplate accompanies and that the army was so dispirited and demonalized that any a tempt to make a movement at that time must result in disaster; that no prominent officers in the army of the Potomac were in favor of any movement at that time.

Gen. Burns de informed the President that none of hi

officers had been informed what his play was, and then pro-ceeded to explain it in d-tail to the President. He urged upon the President to grant him permission to carry i our, but the President declined to do so at that time. G n Hall-ok and Secretary Stanton were cout for, and then learned, for the first time, of the President's action in stopping the movement; although Gen. Halleck was previously aware that a movement was contemplated by Gen. Burn side. Gen. Halleck, with Gen. Burns de, held that the officers who had made those representations to the President should be at once dismissed the service.

Gen. Burnside remained here at that time for two days,

but no conclusion was reached upon the subject. When he returned to his camp he learned that many of the de tails of the general m v ment, and the details of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the rebel sympathrans in Washington, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. When asked to whom he had communicated his pians, he stated that he had told no one in Washington except the President, Secretary Stanton, and Geo. Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it except on or two
of his staff officers, who had remained in camp all the time

He professed himself unable to tell how his plans had be come known to the enemy.

A correspondence then took place between the President, Gen. Halleck, and Gen. Burnside. Gen. Burnside desired distinct authority from Gen. Halleck, or some one while urging the importance and necessity of such a move ment, he candidly admitted that there was hardly a Genral officer in his command who approved of it. While wi ling to take upon himself all the responsibility of the movement, and promising to keep in view the President's caution cone-rning running any risk of destroying the arms of the Potomac, he desired to have at least Gon. Halleck's sanction or permission to make the movement. Gen Hal-leck replied that while he had always favored a forward movement, he could not take the responsibility of giving any directions as to how and when it should be made.

Gen. Burnside then determined to make a movement

without a y further correspondence on the subject. He was unable to device any as promising as the one just thwarted by this interference of his subordinate office which interference gave the enemy the time, if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to do. He, how-ever, devised a plan of movement, and proceeded to put it in execution. As is well known, it was rendered abortive in consequence of the severe storm which took place shortly after the movement began.

Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency of the

weather, there was snother powerful reason for abandoning the movement, viz: the almost universal feeling among his General officers against it. Some of those officers freely gave vent to their feelings in the presence of their interiors. In come quence of this, and also what had taken place during the battle of Fredericksburg, &c., Gen Burnride directed a order to be issued, which he s yl d General Order No. 8. That order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, re-

he strength of the enemy's position was such that our | lieved others from duty with the army of the Potomac and | Had the success of the army of the Potomac during this o pronounced sentence of couth upon some deserters sho had been tried and convered.

Gen Burns de states that he had become satisfied that it was absolutely seen sary that some such examples should be made, in order to enable him to maintain the proper authority over the army under his command. The order was duly signed and issued, and only waited publication. Two or three of his most trusted staff officers ca ion. Two or three of his most trusted staff officers represented to Gen Burnside that should be then publish that order, he would force upon the President the necessity of at once sanctioning it, or, by refusing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility to Gen Burnside The

General Burnside came to Washington and laid the order before the President, with the distinct assurance that in no other way could be exercise a proper command over the army of the Potomac; and be a ked the President to sanction the order, or accept his resignation as major general. The President acknowledged that Gen. Burnside was right, but declined to decide without con u ting with some of his edvisors. To this Gen. Burnelle replied that if the President took time for consultation he would not be allowed to publish that order, and therefore asked to have nis re-ignation accepted at once. This the Pre-ident

declined to do.

General Burnside returned to his camp, and came again to Washington that night at the request of the P esident, and the next morning called upon the President for his decision. He was informed that the President declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded to releve nim from the command of the army of the Potomac, and to appoint General Hocker in his place. Thereupon Gen. Burnside again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the President declined to do; and, after some urging, Gen. Burnside concentral to take a leave of absence for Gen Burnside consented to tak a leave of absence for thi ty days, with the und retanding that, at the end of that time, he should be assigned to dury, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as major general and receive his pay without rendering service therefor. Gen Bu nside bj-cred to the wording of the ord r which releved him from his common t, and which stated that it was at his own request, as b ing unjust to him and unfounded in fact; but upon the representation that any other ord-r would do it jury to the cause he consented to let it remain as it then read.

The foregoing statement of the facts proved, tog-ther with the t-stimony herewith submitted, so fully and d rectly meet the requirements of the resolution ref rred to the mittee deem any comment by them to be entirely unnecessary.

CONCLUSION.

Your committee think it better to submit the testimony which they have taken in relation to the conduct of the war without criticism to any considerable extent of miletary plans and movements, leaving each reader to form his

own conclusions from the testimony, and such opinions of competent military men as it may contain.

As the committee look back over the struggle of the past two years, they feel that although we have not accomd all that we hoped and expected we him the tim still the great progress made gives us full a surance of

When the Government took its first active steps toward resisting the rebellion, the rebels had been for five months actively and openly making preparations to rei tits authority and defy its jurisdiction. They had
usurped the control of the machinery of one State Government after another, and thus overawed the local people of those States. They had even so ar control of the Federal Government itself as to make it not only ac quiesce, for thtime being, in measures for its own des ruction, but con tribute to that end. They had seized and take i into their own possession the arms and munitions of war of the Gov ernment. They had scattered and demoralized the army, and sent the navy to the most distant parts of the world. There was treason in the Executive Massion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Rep. r-sentatives, treason in the army and the may, treason i-every department, bureau, and office connected with the

When the new Administration came into power it was necessarily obliged to adopt its measures with the greatest caution, ecancely knowing friend from toe. An army and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a battalion or loyal national troops to protect the capital; and the first sense of security filt in the capital was when the voluntees troops entered it, summoned from their homes for its protection. At the same time it was with great difficulty that the loyal people could make themselves believe that any serious resistance to the authority of the Government would be at empt-d. There were not wanting the e was confidently asserted that it was but an ourburst of disep ponted partisan spirit, which they predicted would yie o an exhibition of force, and a determined and united spirit in the part of the people of the loyal S ates to suppress it. Instead of such an easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, in warfire. We have thrown spent two years, almost, in warfire. We have thrown into the field a million of men. We have poured out our resources like water, and we find curselves still engaged

in the fea tul st u.g.e.

But the national cause is not the only one for which alse ant cipations were formed-for which the present condition of things presents a striking contrast with the early visions of its supporters Those who heard, in C of gr as and elsewhere, the extravagances of the con-pira ors vill know what were their hopes, what their expectations A speedy march upon the capital; a speedy overthrow of the legal government; a speedy submission of a pe ple oo pusillanimous to maintain their rights; and a speedy subjection of the whole country to the assumptions of the The conspirators taught their people to believe that if war come it would not be on their soil. As y t, the bostile foot has scarcely trod the so l of a free State, and it is upon the soil of the Stat s in open reb llion that the con-

tost has mainly been waged.

The rebels found themselves, almost without resistance. in possession of every fort and harbor on the sea-coast of the revolted States, exc-pt Fort Pickens, Pensscola harthe revolted States, exc-pt Fort Pickens, Pensacola har-bor, and the isolated fortifications and harbors of Tortugas and K-y West. They were, for the time being master-of he territory of the revel ed States of the depots a sec-als, and fortifications of the G-veroment, and had high hopes that all the Slaveholding Border States would soon be united with them. The fact that so many of these States hold to day their true and loyal position in the Govern m of demonstrates hat true patriotism and joyalty is not confined to any s ction of the country, and gives full assurance that the G verament will be maintained, its juris-diction over every foot of our territory established and

The events of the past two years are too fresh in the memories of all to require recapitulation.
Your committee will, however, buefly call attention t the fact, that, from the commencement of active mil tary and naval operations in the winter and spring of 1862, almost uninterrupted success for eight months attended all our ope rations, resulting in vast conquests. The triumpre of the navy at Hatterns, Port Royal, and Fort Henry were fillowed by the victories and conquests of the acmy at Mil Spring, Fort D mison, and Rosnoke Island. Missouri was wrenched from the rebel gra-p, and the .ebel armies

driven into Arkansas, where they were defeated in a pitched bat le at Pea Ridge.

By the capture of Fort Donel on Ken ucky was permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the largest revolted States seized, her great rivers laid open to our fi tillas, and the war carried to the borders of the Gulf States. The rebel strongholds on the Mississeppi, Columbus, I-land No. 10. Fort Pallow, together with Manualis, the meet im-No. 10. Fort Pillow, together with Memphis, the most important commercial city of the S ate, fell into our hands. The autumn of left had witnessed the important cap ture of Hatterns and Port Reyal by the navy. These succasses were followed through the combined operations of the army and navy, in the winter and spring of 1862, by the capture of Ronnoke Island and Newbern, Beaufort, and Fort Macon, and by the reduction of the important Fort Pulaski, controlling the entrance to the Savannah river: of Fort Clinch, controlling the harbor and railroad depot of Fernandina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine By the first-named operations we acquired control of the spacious inland waters of North Carolina, (Albemarle and Pamlico sounds,) and their adjacent shores, and of one of her two important scaports - Beaufort. By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich sea island and import ant harbo:s . x ending along the c ast from Charleston to St John's; leaving in the possession of the rebels, on the Atlantic c ast, but two harbors, Charleston and Wil-

mnigton

But the brilliant triamphs of our army and navy elsewhe e were surpassed by the capture of the great city of the Guif, the depot of the great valley of the Mississippi-New Orleans; an achievement which, estimated by the importance of the conquest and the noble daring of its execution, is scarcely surpassed in history. By this important conquest we obtained control of a large portion of Louisians, and accomplished the most important and d fficult step towards obtaining the entire control of the Mis essippi river, and caused the surrender of the harbor of cola with t e firts yet held by the rebels.

In these has ily sketched military and naval operations, extending in the West through the States of Arkaneas, Missouri, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and on the Atlantic seaboard from Hat eras to Florida, and on the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the slies supply we really made conquests as vast as it often falls to the lot of the most conquests as vast as a collection to the local collection powerful and warlike nations to make in so short a period of time. We pushed our conquests by land through Missouri, K-ntucky, and Tennessee, to the very boundaries of the Gult States; obtained control of the Mississippi r.ver, except about two hundred miles; occupied the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia; a large portion of Louisiana; seized every important fert and harbor in the rebel territory, save three, (Wilmington,

and harbor in the rebel territory, save three, (Wilmington, Charleston, and Mobile.) reducing to a corresponding extent the labors of the blockading squadron: captured four-tern permanent seacoast forts, among which were the largest on the Southern coast, such as Pulaski, Barrancas, McRao, Jackson, and St. Phillip.

Following these conques a was the reduction of Yorktown and the evacuation of Norfolk, by which the waters of the James and York rivers were laid open to our fleets, and the rebels deprived of the facilities fural hed by a great pavy yard, and compelled to destroy their only means of menacing our fleets in Hampton roads—the Merrimack.

period corresponded with the sace as of our arms in other arts of the country here I reas a to b leve that the terms too of the campage of 1862 would have seen the rebellion wel ngh, if not en in ly, overthrown. Had Not rebellion well n.gh. if not en icely, overthrown. Had Notfolk been captured during the winter of 1861-62, and the
Merrimack taken poisession of or destroyed, the way to
Richmond, by means of the James river, would have been
op n. and the fatal delays of the Pennsula avoided; or had
the enemy, when at M. and as, as me time during the autumn
of 1861 or winter of 1861-62, been compelled to have come
out from his entrenchments and give us battle, as he might
have been by threatening or actually interrupting his communication between R chmond and Manassas, on which he
wholly depended for supplies—a line so long and difficult
to maintain that we subsequently did not deem it practicable
for us—we could have met him with an army greater than
it was ever proposed to take against Richmond, and either
have opened the way to the rebel capital or made it it was ever proposed to take against Richmond, and eith

In midiary movements de'sy is generally bad—indecision is almost always fatal. In our movements we seem to have two often forgotten that momentum is made up of weight and velocity; that the force of the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of the mayement as upon the weight of the body moved. The world's history shows that the successful general has met his enemy the day before he was expected—not the week or month after. Some
of our points of attack have been so clearly indicated to
the enemy beforehind, and our movements made with so
much delay and hesitation that he has been able not only
to lortify his positions and concentrate his forces, but even to
call into the field new armies to meet us. At such points
we have failed.

It is par icularly worthy of pate that in the

It is par icularly worthy of note that, in the reverses which followed the failure of the Peninsula campaign, at the time when the army of the rebels had reached its greatest strength and its highest state of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any territory or recapture and hold any of the important or controlling points before held by u- on rebel soil. Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and also Louisville were little more than raids, form which they were obliged to retire before our opposing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it is impossible for us to constantly retain military p secsion of all the vast rebel territory over which we may be called upon to pass in our operations against their armies, still the territory once held or occupied by us cannot be permanently re-gained by them—a sure indication of our ult mate success. The past, not with stunding its errors and reverses, is full The past, notwithstuding its errors and reverses, is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of final success. No great war was ever conducted by any people or Government without great mistakes—giving to the critics of the time and those of succeeding generations a wide and ample field for their labors. No people on earth were ever called suddenly into a great war more totally unprepared than were the loyal people of this Government. We felt so well assured of our position among the Powers of the world that we had almost concluded we had fought our last battle, and our army and navy had come to be regarded by many as useless appendages to the Government. We ed by many as useless appendages to the Government. We had concluded that, doing justice to the nations of the world, we should receive justice in return; and the loyal po tion of the people were devoting all their energies and powers to the arts of peace, the advancement of civilization, the development of the rich and varied resources of our new and great country; and in these every man found all occupation for his tilents and a wide field for his ambi ion—no man even dreaming that the parricidal arm wou'd ever be raised against a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant in its influence over all its subjects.

It was indeed difficult for a people thus engressed, suddealy and almost without warning, to turn its attention to war. The rebels believed us to be so entirely devoted to he pursuits of peace that we should yield to their demands rather than be diverted from them; and hence their netarious attempt to overthrow this fair Government and erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a free Government with human slavery for its corner-stone. How terand yet the energies, and powers and resources of the oyal people have hardly begun to be applied to the suppression of the rebelion. They must meet and contend in battle with that strength, and power, and intelligence which has built factories and workshops, railroads and the strength of the strength steamboats, covered the ocean with ships, and filed the ma kets of the world with the product of its brain and han is; and they will find these no less powe fur for de-struction than for production, when once fully applied in that direction.

All the great industrial interests of the loyal States were never more active, more prosperous, than at this time. All hat has been lost by the supply of mon to the army has been made up by increased activity and energy, and the adaptation of machinery to work heretofors done by the human hand. There is only this marked difference: hereto ore all these great forces have been applied for the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look primarily to the or secution of war; and years would have to chapse—far m re than would be required to crush out the rollion—here we should a valor our full attenuath for war. before we should develop our full strength for war.

Within less than two years we have thrown into and sustained in the field an army of a million of men. We have created a navy with which we have blockeded a coast greater in extent than was ever attempted by any Govern ent before, and by our inventions and improvements e completely revolutionized naval warfare as to rend-r the navies and sea-coast defences of the world well-nigh use-less. The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only by the dest turion of the rebels in every article of fo eign

production, but by the cry that or mes to us every day from ill parts of the world, in any degree dependent upon the erritory, ati greater exertion to crush out this iebellion, that the block-aded ports may be thrown open to the legitimate commere of the wold.

And while, in our efforts to maintain our Government and vind cate free institutions, we neither asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or Government, we did at least expect of the leasing Powers of Europe that they hould refrain from extending aid and encouragement to a rebellion against a friendly Government, thereby prolong ing a strugg'e which can only bring misery and suffering upon the whole civilized word, and may in the end lead to a war between our Government and some of these Powers, he full effects of which the future alone can disclose. We have carried on, shall carry on, and conclude this war without touching one dollar of the accumulated capi-

tal of the country. We are already astonished at the revenue new being raised from the taxation of our daily productions, and yet we do not begin to realize the amoun o be vielded by the system already adopted or the extent to which that system may be colarged, without imposing any grievous burdens upon the people—any burden to which they will not cheerfully submit to accomplish the

which they will not cheerfully subm't to accomplish the object intended.

No Government can long carry on a war which must be sustained by the accomplisted capital of the country, and there is scarcely a limit to the time war may be prosecuted by a Government whose credit is sustained by the revenues derived from the accumulating wealth of the accumulating the repealed or can be accumulated to the accumulation of the accumulation which are repealed to the accumulation which are repealed to the accumulation this repealed to the accumulation of the accumulation this repealed to the accumulation of the accumulation that are repealed to the accumulation that are repealed to the accumulation that are repealed to the accumulation that accumulation the accumulation that accumulation the accumulation to the accumulation the accumulation to th expend in this rebellion has been and must continue to be drawn from their accumulated capital. Their intercourse with foreign nations his been almost wholly suspended, all their industrial interes a have been paralyzed, and there is no source from which they can derive revenue or means for the maintenance of the war, except by depriving the people of their property, day after day, and year after year, so long as the war shall continue, thus reducing them to poverty and want. This is a truth which the people in the poverty and want. I have a truth which the people in the revol ed States are already beginning to realize. They had been made to believe that an export duty on cotton, which the world would be obliged to pay, would yield them the richest revenue ever realized by any Government; and that if the Federal Government should attempt interference with its exportation, they could command the armies and naties of Europe to fight their battles for them. How bitter must be their disappointment as they apply with their own hands the torch which consigns it to ashes, and then are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their other property, the means to sustain the rebellion their other property, the means to sustain the rebellion!

Their currency has almost ceased to be regarded, even by
themselves, as the representative of value. Conscription
has exhausted their people, and the wealth which long
years of uninterrup et prosperity, under the best Government the world ever saw, had placed in their hands, has
alreed, been expended, and they are now struggling on
with the vain hape that dissensions among ourselves or
foreign intervention may save them from that roin which
they are clean is improving over they see clea ly impending over them. Every day must show them more and more clearly that on neither of these sources can they rely for help. The utter scorn and contempt with which every man in the Loyal States who proposes any adjustment of this contest except the absolute unqualified, and unconditional subjugation of every rebel in the land to the Constitution and the laws, is held by

in the land to the Constitution and the laws, is held by every officer and soldier in our army, and every loyal man in the country, must banish from their minds the last ray of hope from that source. The reaction which followed the recent slight manifestations of a willingness on the part of a few excession sympathizers to off r terms of compromise must convince them that they have no allies in the Loyal States on whom they can rely; and the present condition of affairs in Europe must forever crush that false and delinive hips which they have heretofore entertained, that the intervention of European Powers might enable them to accomplish what they know full well they can never attain unaided.

We now see clearly what we have to do. We must obtain uninterrupted cintrol of the Mississippi. We must reach those great railroad arteries—the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, the other stretching through the Virginia and Fennessee valleys to the West and South. We must, as soon as possible, take the few fortified seap rate remaining in possession of the rebels; and then we shall have virtually disarmed the rebellion, cut it if from all external sources of food and arms, and have surrounded at by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the same time severing into isolated portions the rebell territory and destroying their means of intercommunication, by which alone they have hitherto been caabled to meet us in force wherever we have presented ourselves, and by which alone they have been able to feed and supply their armies. which alone they have been able to feed and supply their

By possessing ourselves of and keeping open the great natural highways alone (and a possession of a navy by us

should have early suggested this) we sever parts of their territory matually dependent, and, while orippling them, ouable ourselves to speedily concentrate our forces at any point where it may be ascendio to strike. These decisive measures we are actually excusting or preparing to execute. The successes and conquests we have already described have carried as though the preliminary stages, and the blows we now strike—each one of them that succeeds—will reach the very vitals of the rebellion. Let any one cast his eye upon the map and these truths will be apparent.

be apparent.

It may be in the future, as in the past, we shall meet with reverses; they are the inevitable incidents of a great war extending over so vast a territory, and requiring great war extending over so vast a territory, and requiring great armies at so widely separated points. We have alread seen that it is not our true policy to attempt an actual mi litary occupation of the reord territory, except at a few and supportant controlling points. We must destroy their a mies, and to do this we must concentrate, not scatter our forces. It is better to operate successfully against on stronghold or one army that to attempt three and fail. The indications now clearly are that, both in the East and the West, the campagn of 1863 will give us ordhant schievements—decisive victories. Our generals now if the field have the full co-filence of the coldiers and the people, and the armies will g, for h knowing that the ranks are to be made full; that every day that passes will add to, not dimini h, their streigts or numbers Nev : before did the world see such a sarmy in the field; never before and Generals 1 ad such men to battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that he has a soldier's reputa-tion to maintain, but also that he has a country to defend m which his interest is as great as that of the highest officer in the land. Such an army, with its energy, power,
intelligence, and will, properly directed, must be invincible. The past has already demonstrated that the true
American soldier can be relied upon, to dare do, and endure all that human power can attempt, accomplish, or
sustain. Let no men be placed or kept in command of
such men who have not the ability to command and the
will to do; thus the errors and mistakes of the past will
be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and anticipations
of a true and loyal people red zed, the Government vindicated, and rebation speedily and forever crushed.

We know that this context has cost us and will cost us
treasures and blood— he but blood ever shed by any peoin which his interest is as great as that of the highest offi-

treatures and blood—h.b at blood ever shed by any peo-ple in maintenance of their Government and in defence of ree institutions—the blood of the flower of our land. Let us no make their lives a vain offering, by for a moment euter aining the idea of a partiti n of our territory, which would forever involve us in anarchy and border ware, or by any base compromise with rebels. We owe it to the noble dead who have shed their blood in founding and deleading this Government; we owe it to ourselves; we owe it to the countless millions who are to come after us, to maintain this Government and the institutions we have inherited from our lathers—the richest legacy ever bequeathed by one generation to another—and to transmit them to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unimpaired

In conclusion, your committee will only say, that all the men who ho d high positions in the army and navy, and have rendered valuable services to the country, with whom they have hild intercourse, unite in the op.nion that fighting, and only fighting, can end this rebellion; that every trastor in the land must and shall be made to acknowledge and yield absolute, unqualified, and unconditional obedie to the Constitution and laws. And your committee believe this to be the sen iment, not only of the army and navy, but of every man in the country-traitors and coward

The foregoing report is sanctioned and signed by all the esent members of the committee, viz :

Hon. B. F. WADE, Senator from Oaio. Hou. Z. CHANDLER, Senstor from Michigan. Hop. D. W. GOOCH, Representative from Mass.

Hon. JOHN COVODE, Representative from Penn. Hon. GEO. W. JULIAN, Representative from Ind. H .n M F. ODELL, Representative from New York. Governor Johnson, of Tendessee, was an original memor of the committee, and on his appointment as military

lovernor of Tennessee his place on the committee was supplied by Ex-Governor WRIGHT, of Indiana, but since the latter gentlem in was superseded in the Senate by Mr. TURPLE the vacancy on the committee has not been filed. so that it now consists only of the six members above

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE ARMY.

Special Despatch to the Republican. HEALQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Falmouth, April 8, 1363.

The President and Mrs. Lincoln and Attorney General Bates have had quite an ovation here for several days, not. withstanding the terrible snow storm of Saturday night, during which the steamer on which the party had embarked remained at anchor off Indian Head;

Reaching the landing at Aquia creek on Sunday morning, the President and party took a special train for Falmouth station, where four-horse spring wagons were in waiting to convey them to headquarters. One of General Hooker's personal staff accompanied the party, which was escorted by a company of Pennsylvania lancers. The journey of a mile and a half over the desolated country must have convinced the Presid-nt that the movement of troops

have convinced the President that the movement of troops just now is not very practicable

Two large hospital tents had been pitched near that of Gen. Hooker, one of which was occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Lincoln and their youngest son; the other was occupied by Judge Bates and three gentlemen from the Pacific coast, who are in the Presidential party. On Sunday night there were serenades by the bands of the Eleventh and Thirty-third Massachusetts Infantry and the Second and Six h Caralys.

On Monday morning the sun came out for awhile and the snow soon disappeared, adding to the depth of the clayey mud. At 10 o'clock Gen. Hooker present d his p-ramal staff to the President at headquarters. Mean wh le an aid escorted Mrs. Lincoln to the river back, where with the naked eye, she could see the dismantled town of Freder, ckaburg and the rebel pickets on the opposite shore Fredericksburg and the rebel pickets on the opposite shore.

At moon the 'resident mounted a bay charger and rode from headquarters. Gen. Hooker, mounted on his gallant white steed, rode at his left, and they were followed by at least fifty officers, handsomely uniformed, making an imposing appearance rarely equalled on this continent as the party dashed over the hills, escorted by the lancers with fluttering pennons. Meanwhile thousands and thousands of cavalry had been moving from their respective encampments to the ground designated for their review. All were under the command of Major Gen. Stoneman, chief of cavalry, whore aides de camp conducted each command to its plees, and when the campon thundered forth a welcome to pl. ce, and when the cannon thundered forth a welcome to the President, one could see as far as the eye could reach serried ranks of horsemen, their sobres glittering in the sun At the reviewing flag was a large group of officers, mounted on fine horses, with a few lidies on horseback.

Mrs. Lincoln, Attorney Gereral Bates, and a few others

were in carriages.

The President first rode up and down the lines, with his hat in his hand, bowing acknowledgments to the salutes given him by each officer, while the bands played "Hail to the Chief" as he passed their respective regiments. Gen. H. oker rode at his left hand, while on his right hand rode Gen. Stoneman. The staff which followed must have been

Gen. Stoneman. The staff which followed must have been a hundred strong and famously med bespattered they all were before they had gone the grand rounds.

After having ridden through the lines, the President took up his position at the national flag, and the cavalry, breaking from line into column by squadron, passed in review. It was an imposing specially to see beigade after brugade, regiment after regiment, squadron after aquadron, move steadily past, the man and horses looking well and ready for service. After the mass of cavalry had gone by the horse artillery thundered past, every man mounted.

In fifteen minutes after the last battery had passed by the President the entire body of troops, the reviewing officer, and the spectators had all left the ground. While the display cheered the heart of every Union man and woman present, it must have struck terror into the hearts of the shivering rebels who could easily have witnessed every movement from the hills behind Fredericksburg.

After the President had returned from the review, a large number of general officers were recovered.

After the President had returned from the

After the President had returned from the review, a large number of general officers were presented to him at headqonsters, and later in the day dined with Gen. Hooker, who also had as guests seven major generals. Mrs. Gen. Stoneman was pre ent.

The fine appearance of the cavalry and the horse artillery was an agreeable surprise to all who witnessed the review, as the animals had all been exposed to the winter's storms. They had evidently been well fed and well cared for; neither can they fail to render powerful aid in the coming campaign.

the coming campaign.
It had been intended to have a grand review of infantry on yesterday, (Tuesday.) but it was evident to all who were out on Monday that it would involve marching in deep mud and wading through swellen water courses, so

deep mud and wading through awollen water courses, so it was postponed.

President Lincolo, accompanied by Gen. Hooker and staff, rode out to visit several hospitals, and called on several Generals at their beadquarters. Mrs. Lincoln at one time proposed to return to Washington in the afternoon with Attorney General Bates, but was prevailed upon to remain. Judge Bates left at 3 o'clock with Capt. Crawford, of the Presidential party. To-day (Wednesday) the infantry review will come off, and President Lincoln will return this afternoon, unless he decides to awast until toreturn this eftern on, unless he decides to await until tomorrow morning and go up by daylight. The distinguished visitors appear to have enjoyed their visit, and to like camp life.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, - Wednesday, April 8, 1863.

A review of a portion of the army took place to-day on the plain in the rear of Falmouth. General Hook r and his Corps Commanders were present. The scene presented was undoubtedly one of the finest military pageants ever witnessed on this Continent.